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DISPERSED CAPITAL AND MORAL
AUTHORITY: THE PARADOX OF
SUCCESS IN THE UNREGULATED




In this age of Enron and WorldCom it may be hard to fathom the no-
tion of successful, robust capital markets without extensive government
regulation. Yet the 19th century New York capital markets offer a strik-
ing picture of success despite the aura of Robber Baron buccaneering.
This article will describe how the New York markets fostered the
growth of great enterprises-first the railroads and then the supporting
cast of gigantic industrials-by breaking the investment into tiny bits-
shares that sanctioned the infusion of massive amounts of domestic and
European capital. Security came from the liquidity provided, thus over-
coming the hold-up effect present in smaller, family-controlled corpora-
tions or partnerships.
This article also addresses the riotous nature of the mid-century mar-
kets and their manipulation by unscrupulous investors such as the early
Jay Gould and Daniel Drew. It shows how the moral authority of great
investment bankers like Morgan, reputable brokers, and the New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE) exerted their considerable influence to render
the markets relatively transparent and safe for domestic and foreign capi-
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tal, despite the climate of legislative and judicial corruption: an interest-
ing model for modern minds to ponder.
I. INTRODUCTIONAT first glance the United States was not the most auspicious loca-
tion on the globe to develop vibrant and sophisticated capital
markets.1 One would have thought that the greatest capital mar-
ket would have remained in Europe, probably London. London, cer-
tainly, because of its head start, sound institutions, and growing global
trade during the 19th century. Yet the upstart American Republic was to
wrest supremacy from London, and did so with capital markets that con-
tained relatively little formal regulation.
The law of unintended consequences may have been at play here.
Pressure from the South Sea Company was responsible for the passage of
the Bubble Act of 1720. The company impressed Parliament, many mem-
bers having considerable self-interest, to pass the Bubble Act, squelching
Bubble Company competitors of the South Sea Company. The Act pro-
hibited the creation of joint stock companies (prototypes of the modern
corporation) without permission of Parliament or the Crown. The impact
of the Act was both immediate and far-reaching. First, it was a conspicu-
ous cause of the rapid deflation of the South Sea Bubble. The Act and
concurrent prosecutions of competitors not only crippled the competi-
tion, these legal attacks also deflated the value of the South Sea Company
stock. The long-range effect was even more devastating-business orga-
nizations in Great Britain had a harder time obtaining charters. Parlia-
ment extended the Bubble Act to the colonies. America jettisoned the
Bubble Act with the Revolution and the states liberally chartered corpo-
rations in the 19th century. In the long run, the consequences of the Bub-
ble Act proved to be significant. 2
This article begins with a brief description of the American economy
after the conclusion of the American Revolution. The new nation was a
huge debtor with virtually valueless currency 3 and was in danger of being
1. At the end of the 18th century, continental North America was a wilderness and
rightly regarded as such. The prize was the West Indies with its wealth based on
the sugar trade. See FRED ANDERSON, CRUCIBLE OF WAR: THE SEVEN YEARS'
WAR AND THE FATE OF EMPIRE IN BRITISH NORTH AMERICA, 1754-1766 497-506
(2000). The Caribbean was rich because of sugar. At the conclusion of the conflict
in 1763, England seriously considered restoring Canada to France in exchange for
Guadeloupe! See also RICHARD BROOKHISER, ALEXANDER HAMILTON, AMERI-
CAN 13 (1999). The United States, in 1800 did not seem to have such magnificent
wealth-generating opportunities.
2. STUART WEEMS BRUCHEY, ENTERPRISE: THE DYNAMIC ECONOMY OF A FREE
PEOPLE 131 (1990) [hereinafter ENTERPRISE].
3. America, at the conclusion of the war for independence, was a weak debtor nation.
It owed $2 million to Dutch banking houses and about $5 million to the French (in
nominal, historical dollar values). ENTERPRISE, supra note 2, at 118. In 1786, the
total income of the central government was less than one-third of the charges
owed the national debt. Id. The situation under the Articles of Confederation
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picked apart by European powers. Great Britain did not evacuate its
frontier forts until the signing of the Jay Treaty (1793), 4 significantly later
than the Treaty of Paris (1783) 5 that concluded the conflict. Spain con-
trolled Florida, the critical port of New Orleans, and west of the Missis-
sippi. In 1802, Napoleon intended to use Saint Dominique6 as an
entrep6t for the Louisiana Territory, which Spain had recently ceded to
France. Had the Haitian rebels, led by the capable slave L'Ouverture,
and yellow fever not defeated General Leclerc, Haiti might have facili-
tated French domination west of the Mississippi. The United States was
fortunate; the Haitian expedition failed and Napoleon needed funds to
renew his European conflict with Great Britain. The result was the 1803
Louisiana Purchase. Great Britain attempted to sever the United States
by splitting New York from New England and taking New Orleans.
7
American borders finally obtained security with the Treaty of Ghent
(1814) that ended the War of 1812. Had Jackson been defeated at New
Orleans, it is possible that the borders agreed upon in the Treaty of
Ghent would have been revised, with the United States blocked by a tri-
umphant Britain both at the mouth of the Mississippi and Canada to the
north.
In 1800, America was a rural nation with a largely subsistent economy.
Her exports were primarily agricultural; she imported luxuries and neces-
sities from her principal trading partner, the English. Yet, by the 1850s,
America had discovered and successfully developed the modern corpora-
tion and was becoming an increasingly industrial and commercial nation.
The America of 1900 spanned the continent with railroads, created great
industries, such as oil and steel, and was a rising industrial rival of France,
Great Britain, and Germany.
This article explains how the development of the modern corporation
solved the hold-up problem that plagued small, family-owned businesses
(both corporate and non-corporate). 8 A hold-up occurs when an investor
threatens to leave the business by pulling out capital or withdrawing ser-
vices. This is easily accomplished in a partnership because partnerships
are terminated by the withdrawal of a partner. The very threat may per-
worsened. The Confederation was burdened with huge debts because it lacked
taxation powers; hence, it could neither pay, nor service the debt.
4. Jay's Treaty, U.S.-Gr. Brit., art. 3, Nov. 19, 1794, 8 Stat. 116.
5. Treaty of Paris, U.S.-Spain, Dec. 10, 1898, 30 Stat. 1754.
6. Saint Dominique is the French name for the former Caribbean possession of
Spain. Haiti and the Dominican Republic now occupy that island.
7. The critical campaign was the invasion of New York from Canada on down the
Champlain Valley. The intent was to split New England (that had secessionist and
pro-British leanings) from the rest of the United States. The sacking of Washing-
ton was retaliation for the burning of York (Toronto) and a diversion, as was the
invasion of Louisiana. But had the Louisiana invasion succeeded, the United
States may have seen its western expansion blocked. See DAVID G. FITZ-ENZ,
THE FINAL INVASION: PLATTSBURGH, THE WAR OF 1812's MOST DECISIVE BAT-
TLE (John R. Elting ed., 2001).
8. See Christian C. Day, Partner to Plutocrat: The Separation of Ownership from
Management in Emerging Capital Markets-19th Century Industrial America, 58 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 525 (2004) [hereinafter Partner to Plutocrat].
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mit the party to exact greater rents. A related concern was the need to
lock-up or lock-in capital to enable the business to grow and exploit op-
portunities.9 Partnerships were fragile organizations due to the hold-up
problem, death, illness, and disability (also causing termination). The
corporation of the 19th century, because of its separate personality and
the difficulty of dissolving it, permitted the amassing of sufficient capital
to create large and innovative businesses that had staying power.
As is discussed below in the section on railroads, the American corpo-
ration locked in sufficient wealth to exploit large opportunities. Very
early on, railroad corporations sold shares in small denominations, invit-
ing many to invest, and creating liquidity-breaking the investment into
bits and pieces, shares available to many, many interested parties.10
9. See Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Bus-
iness Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REV. 387 (2003) [hereinaf-
ter Locking in Capital]. The corporate structure facilitates the lock-in of capital
and its retention for productive uses. Professor Blair believes this 19th century
development was critical to the development of the modern corporate enterprise.
The capital lock-in, denying capricious withdrawals that plague partnerships, and
the liquidity offered by the modern plutocratic form and capital markets created
an investment model second to none.
But see Larry E. Ribstein, Should History Lock In Lock-In? (I11. Law and Econ.
Working Papers Series, Working Paper No. LE06-005, 2006), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/pape.tar?abstractid=883648. Ribstein critiques Blair's conclu-
sions, and considers "whether the corporate form was necessary to achieve" the
goal of capital lock in. Id. at 9. Ribstein concludes that the business forms availa-
ble before the corporation (partnerships, joint stock companies, etc.) were capable
of locking in capital, and that firms did not use the corporate form merely to
achieve capital lock in. Id. at 9-14. Instead, Ribstein believes that limited liability,
not capital lock in, was the main characteristic that firms desired when forming a
corporation. Id. at 15-16.
"[L]imitation or elimination of liability of the shareholders is not merely
the chief single advantage of a business corporation but it is the advan-
tage which in the estimation of legislatures and also in the estimation of
the public is of more importance than all the other advantages put to-
gether. It is the main thing."
Id. at 14 (quoting EDWARD H. WARREN, CORPORATE ADVANTAGES WITHOUT IN-
CORPORATION 399 (William S. Hein & Co., Inc. 1929)). This article does not argue
that capital lock in was the reason for use of the corporate form, but instead that
lock in was one of the advantages the corporate form had to offer. See infra Sec-
tion III.
As will be seen in this article, Professor Blair has the stronger argument because
it is inconceivable that the transcontinental railroads and the gigantic industries
that they spawned could have been built without the massive capital provided by
relatively well-run and liquid capital markets. And those markets were buoyed by
dispersed investment-counter-intuitive, yet powerfully effective. For an excellent
history of the rise of big business, see CHARLES R. MORRIS, THE TYCOONS: How
ANDREW CARNEGIE, JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER, JAY GOULD, AND J.P. MORGAN IN-
VENTED THE AMERICAN SUPERECONOMY (Times Books 2005).
10. Foreign capital was essential to the success of the United States. Europe enjoyed a
capital surplus, due to its more mature industries and thrift. The United States
offered a considerably higher yield (10 percent versus 5 percent). This higher rate
of return is related of course to risk and liquidity. American capital markets were
less well-developed, hence less liquid. The choice of the plutocratic corporation
led to diversified shareholding and increased liquidity. Eventually gatekeepers
like investment bankers were to provide effective monitoring. This invited a mas-
sive influx of capital that helped to sustain American development for the entire
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This liquidity concurrently fed the growth of the capital markets in
New York, Boston, Baltimore, and Philadelphia."a Further, railroads pio-
neered the hierarchical management structure of the modern corpora-
tion. This solved the agency problem of supervising sophisticated
businesses over the great expanse of America. Hierarchical management
permitted expert stewards (division superintendents, mechanical officers,
and other executives) to manage gargantuan enterprises over, eventually,
continental distances. This new management structure substituted for the
close, personal supervision that was commonplace in businesses of the
era. The high quality of this new class of professional managers 12 and the
liquidity provided by the ever-growing capital markets brought more cap-
ital into the pool, fueling greater industrial and commercial expansion.
Next, this article explores the effect of exploitation by predatory inves-
tors on the mid-century market. The market looked like a sucker's game.
The capital markets of the 1850s and into the 1860s were ripe for ex-
ploitation. And exploited they were! Developing capital markets are
often shallow and dominated by large holdings, causing illiquidity and
fostering instability. American markets followed that pattern. As the
railroads developed and became hot investments, unscrupulous investors
such as Daniel Drew, known as the Speculative Director, and the early
Jay Gould attempted to corner markets. Drew, Gould, and Jim Fisk also
took advantage of corrupt judges and legislatures as they attempted to
control the Erie Railroad and other investments.
During the Erie Railroad battles, the tide began to turn. A youthful
Jay P. Morgan, an ally of Cornelius Vanderbilt, decided to make
merchant bankers (our investment bankers), honest brokers for foreign
and domestic investors.1 3
The penultimate section of this article describes the ultimate regulation
by norms and market institutions, rather than through government regu-
19th century. JEAN STROUSE, MORGAN: AMERICAN FINANCIER 71 (Random
House 1999) [hereinafter MORGAN].
11. See generally Christian C. Day, Investor Power & Liquidity: Corporations, Capital
Markets and the Industrialization of America, 5 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 345
(2001) [hereinafter Investor Power].
12. The military and the Civil War also play a key role. West Point and the Army
Corps of Engineers trained many of the railroad executives and surveyors. For
instance, General Granville Dodge was a key player in the building of the Union
Pacific, and he was only one of many! Many military officers with Civil War ser-
vice staffed the railroad executive corps, employing chains of command that mim-
icked the military's.
13. Titans of industry, commerce, and finance are still pejoratively referred to as Rob-
ber Barons. The term comes from ancient brigands who robbed merchants and
travelers in narrow mountain passes. While the term is colorful and used to great
effect, see MATTHEW JOSEPHSON, THE ROBBER BARRONS: THE GREAT AMERI-
CAN CAPITALISTS 1861-1901 (Harcourt, Brace & Co. 1934), the application is in-
correct. Josephson and other critics of capitalism seem to have missed that these
barons created the great industries and infrastructures in the first place. They did
not swoop down from the hills and plunder the innocent. Certainly these capital-
ists reaped great profits. They also knitted the nation together, founded great in-
dustries, employed millions, and propelled the United States to a world power.
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lation (through agencies, legislation, or judicial decisions). The moral au-
thority exercised by Morgan and others, coupled with stock brokerage
firms favoring and pushing for fair markets and disclosure made the mar-
kets more liquid, open, and transparent. Last, but not least, the anti-com-
petitive NYSE, in an effort to enhance its power, sought to brand the
NYSE and its listed companies as being reputable and of high quality.
The NYSE worked to protect its brand and offered high-quality firms to
the investing public and institutions.
Finally, this article concludes by asserting that by the end of the 19th
century, the United States had developed relatively transparent and liq-
uid markets without resort to extensive regulation. This was accom-
plished because the modern corporation, employed to build and operate
railroads, needed liquid markets and massive amounts of capital. Wall
Street titans, like Morgan, investment banks, stockbrokers, and the
NYSE all contributed to the regulation of the market by norms and non-
governmental standards. The success of these norms and this quality of
regulation continued to attract capital and built capital markets that ri-
valed, and would soon supplant, those of Europe.
II. THE STAGE IS SET: PRE-INDUSTRIAL AMERICA POST
REVOLUTION AND BEFORE THE COMING OF THE
RAILROADS (CIRCA 1783-1830)
At the conclusion of the War for Independence, America was in a pre-
industrial stage; before the development of railroads, businesses were re-
ally only local businesses. Most businesses were conducted as partner-
ships and proprietorships. 14 Because the American continent had
primitive transportation, much of the economic activity and market ex-
changes were local as well. The Appalachian Mountain chain blocked
access to the fertile Ohio Valley. It had to be surmounted if America was
to quench its desire for farmland. The requirement of better transporta-
tion would create the demand for public works projects like turnpikes,
canals, etc.-most built by the earliest corporations chartered under spe-
cial acts by state legislatures. 15 While there was some coastal trade be-
tween states and oceanic trade with Europe and the West Indies,
primitive networks of roads did not encourage trade or the development
of businesses of any magnitude.
Roughly 6 percent of the nation's five million people resided in urban
14. Today, the bulk of American businesses remain small businesses and about 75 per-
cent are still partnerships and proprietorships. ROBERT L. HEILBRONER & LES-
TER C. THUROW, ECONOMICS EXPLAINED 45 (Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1998).
15. Joseph S. Davis, Charters for American Business Corporations in the Eighteenth
Century, 15 PUB. AM. STAT. ASS'N 426, 429 (1916). For one of the best general
accounts of late 18th century American corporate development, see JOSEPH STAN-
CLIFFE DAVIS, 2 ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF AMERICAN CORPORATIONS
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY BUSINESS CORPORATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
(Harvard Univ. Press 1917).
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areas in 1800.16 Sixty percent lived in towns of less than 25,000.17 House-
holds were the predominant economic unit and they functioned in a hier-
archical manner. Thus, late in the 18th century and into the beginning of
the 19th century, much of America's economic activity centered on the
home and small businesses that replicated the management functions of
subsistence farms. But the new nation would soon be on the verge of
economic change as it attempted to place itself on a strong economic
footing.
A. THE FINANCE-LED ECONOMIC REVOLUTION 18
The Federalist economic program of Alexander Hamilton and the nas-
cent American banking system (discussed infra) provided the framework
for a finance-led economic transformation of the American continent.
"By any standards, the U.S. economy experienced a near-miraculous
turnaround in the last decade of the 18th century, when it made the tran-
sition from a defaulting debtor awash in obligations left over from the
war of independence to a magnet for international capital flows." 19
In Hamilton's economic plans, the American debt was monetized, fol-
lowing the Bank of England model.20 The new federal debt was known
as Hamilton 6s (because of the interest rate). 21 The Hamilton 6s were
redeemable at par, like consuls. They were extremely popular and very
quickly established their value, regularly trading above par (indicating
the strength of the investment). 22 Monetization accomplished two impor-
tant goals: it provided necessary funds to operate the government and
greatly increased the liquidity of the economy that in turn attracted more
capital.23 Finally, historian Richard Hildreth skillfully summarized the
16. Naomi R. Lamoreaux et al., Beyond Markets and Hierarchies: Toward a New Syn-
thesis of American Business History 12 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research Working
Paper No. 9029, 2002), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w9029.
17. Id.
18. Portions of the discussion in this section are adapted from Partner to Plutocrat,
supra note 8, at 532-37.
19. Peter L. Rousseau, Historical Perspectives on Financial Development and Eco-
nomic Growth, 85 FED. RES. BANK ST. L. REV. 81, 92 (2003), available at http://
research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/03/07/Rousseau.pdf (limited liability
for American banking corporations was critical in the development of banks and
capital markets).
20. While the American public debt system resembled England's, the federal fiscal
system bore close resemblances to that of the Dutch. NIALL FERGUSON, THE
CASH NEXUS: MONEY AND POWER IN THE MODERN WORLD, 1700-2000 115 (Basic
Books 2001).
21. Id.
22. See Peter L. Rousseau & Richard Sylla, Emerging Financial Markets and Early
U.S. Growth 6 (Vanderbilt Univ., Dept. of Econ., Working Paper No. 00-W15, May
2000), available at http://www.vanderbilt.edu/Econ/wparchive/workpaper/vuOO-
wl5.pdf [hereinafter Emerging Financial Markets]; see also JOHN STEELE
GORDON, HAMILTON'S BLESSING: THE EXTRAORDINARY LIFE AND TIMES OF
OUR NATIONAL DEBT 38-39 (1997) [hereinafter HAMILTON'S BLESSING] (by 1794,
the United States had the highest credit rating in Europe and some of its bonds
were selling at 10% over par!).
23. HAMILTON'S BLESSING, supra note 22, at 11-41.
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long-term effects of the Hamiltonian policies:
The great secret of the beneficial operation of the funding system
was the reestablishment of confidence; for commercial confidence,
though political economists may have omitted to enumerate it
among the elements of production, is just as much one of those ele-
ments as labor, land, or capital-a due infusion of it increasing in a
most remarkable degree the productive activity of those other ele-
ments, and the want of it paralyzing their power to a corresponding
extent. By the restoration of confidence in the nation, confidence in
the states, and confidence in individuals, the funding system actually
added to the labor, land, and capital of the country a much greater
value than the amount of debt thereby charged upon them. 24
Treasury Secretary Hamilton correctly reported that the government's
monetary policies were necessary to attract both domestic and foreign
capital. He accurately foresaw that America would need to import Euro-
pean capital.25 Hamilton presaged what happened in the 19th and 20th
centuries as America's sound monetary policies and investment opportu-
nities attracted foreign capital to build, sustain, and expand a continental
economy. 26
B. THE EARLY ROLE OF BANKS AND SECURITIES MARKETS2 7
The United States restructured its large war debt within five years of
the ratification of the Constitution. It introduced the dollar as its cur-
rency and created a national banking system. This banking structure
linked securities markets and gained the confidence of many European
24. RICHARD HILDRETH, 1 THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 276
(Harper Bros. 1856) (quoted in ENTERPRISE, supra note 2, at 129).
25. The aid of foreign Capital may safely, and, with considerable latitude, be
taken into calculation. Its instrumentality has been long experienced in
our external commerce; and it has begun to be felt in various other
modes. Not only our funds, but our Agriculture and other internal im-
provements have been animated by it. It has already in a few instances
extended even to our manufactures. It is a well known fact, that there
are parts of Europe, which have more Capital, than profitable domestic
objects of employment. Hence, among other proofs, the large loans con-
tinually furnished to foreign states. And it is equally certain that the
capital of other parts may find more profitable employment in the
United States, than at home. And notwithstanding there are weighty in-
ducements to prefer the employment of capital at home even at less
profit, to an investment of it abroad, though with greater gain, yet these
inducements are overruled either by a deficiency of employment or by a
very material difference in profit. Both these Causes operate to produce
a transfer of foreign capital to the United States.
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, Report on the Subject of Manufacturers, December 5,
1791, in WRITINGS 647, 677-78 (Joanne B. Freeman ed., Columbia Univ. Press
2001) (1961).
26. "By 1801 Europeans held $33 million in U.S. securities, and European capital was
helping mightily to build the American economy." HAMILTON'S BLESSING, supra
note 22, at 39.
27. Portions of the discussion in this section are adapted from Partner to Plutocrat,
supra note 8, at 537-39.
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investors. 28
In 1789, there were only three banks.2 9 By the 1790s, twenty-eight
banks were chartered. 30 In the next decade, seventy-three more were
chartered. 3 1 They were quite profitable and often yielded 8 percent.
32
By 1825, it was estimated that English equity was not significantly greater
than United States bank equity (the Bank of the United States and state-
chartered banks) of $138 million.33 The English and American capital
markets were about the same size by the mid-1820s, even though the En-
glish had a century's lead-time. 34
The fact that the United States had the same amount of capitalization
with fewer listed firms supports the inference that America was more
heavily capitalized. This was a consequence of its lead in chartering
banking corporations with limited liability.35 State chartering was liberal
and democratic. America had more competition and comparable bank
capital by the mid-1820s because legislatures were liberal in their charter-
ing and did not attempt to protect a favored corporation, as Great Britain
did with its Bank of England. British legislation prohibited the chartering
of banks with more than six investors without special legislation-the in-
tent was to insulate the Bank of England from competitive threat.
36
While both capital markets listed utilities, transportation, insurance, and
manufacturing companies, the big difference was in bank capital.
28. Emerging Financial Markets, supra note 22, at 2.
29. Id. They were the Bank of New York (New York), the Bank of North America
(Philadelphia), and the Bank of Massachusetts (Boston). Their small size, primi-
tive transportation and communication infrastructure, and great distances made




33. Id. at 12.
34. By 1825, America,
with a population still smaller than that of England and Wales (11.1 ver-
sus 12.9 million), had roughly 2.4 times the banking capital of the lat-
ter .... This was not entirely the result of the U.S. financial revolution.
English policy, and in particular the monopoly privileges of the Bank of
England and the restriction of all other banks and unlimited-liability
partnerships of six or fewer people, retarded banking development in
that country until 1825, when the policy was altered to allow joint-stock
banking with unlimited liability.
Emerging Financial Markets, supra note 22, at 7-8.
35. State chartering was liberal and democratic. America had more competition and
comparable bank capital by the mid-1820s because legislatures were liberal in their
chartering and not attempting to protect a favored corporation, as Great Britain
was with its Bank of England. British legislation prohibited the chartering of
banks with more than six investors without special legislation-the intent was to
insulate the Bank of England from competitive threat.
36. English banks were limited to six partners by the legislation, thus restricting the
size and geographic scope of banking operations because of the partners' liability.
Liam Brunt & Edmund Cannon, Asset Prices, Banks and Financial Market Integra-
tion in the British Industrial Revolution 3 (Cardiff Bus. Sch. Economic Seminars,
2004), available at http://www.cardiff.ac.uk/carbs/econ/resources/seminars/archive/
liamwheat.pdf. American banks, had no such limitation on and, in many instances,
were protected by limited liability.
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America had a lot of money to lend due to its liberal chartering policies. 37
In 1840 there were 834 banks; by 1860, the number had nearly doubled
again. Bank capital increased from $3 million in 1790 to an astonishing
$426 million in 1840.38
American enterprise was also given a boost by the development of se-
curities markets. Within two years of the national debt refunding legisla-
tion in the 1790s, trading was so great in federal and state securities that
brokers formed an exchange under the fabled Buttonwood Tree at the
foot of Wall Street. This exchange, of course, later became known as the
NYSE. Within 100 years, the NYSE would eclipse London's as the great-
est exchange in the world.39 With the 1790 debt refinancing and the crea-
tion of the Bank of the United States in 1791, securities markets arose in
America's four major cities: New York, Boston, Philadelphia, and Balti-
more. These markets gave investors the opportunity to trade both debt
and equity issues. They also provided domestic and foreign investors
with liquidity, thereby giving them the courage to invest in the new na-
tion. The success of the markets is demonstrated by the fact that Europe-
ans owned more than half of the American federal debt, the Bank of
United States stock, and more than half of the listed securities. 40
Thus, the early securities markets, the Bank of the United States, and
the competition of state banks provided a growing pool of capital for
businesses that needed it. As corporations evolved and became engaged
in larger enterprises, such as canal and rail networks, the capital markets
would further the growth of the economy.
That expansion was coming and would build on the capital markets;
but the nation was not there yet. American finance and law had first to
solve the hold-up and lock-up problems. Then, the railroads, with their
massive need of capital would rapidly increase the liquidity of the mar-
kets. The next section describes the hold-up problem and discusses its
favorable resolution in the large corporation.
III. BREAKING THE HOLD-UP, SELLING SHARES, AND
LOCKING UP CAPITAL
This section explains the fragility of partnerships (and other small busi-
ness forms). Next, it describes how the public corporation was able to
lock-in capital, providing a pool of resources to exploit opportunities and
expand operations. This section concludes with thoughts on how invest-
ments can be broken into discrete bits and pieces-shares to of all us-
and sold in a market, offering great liquidity because the market provides
freedom from capital kick-in and an efficient exit strategy.
37. Emerging Financial Markets, supra note 22, at 13.
38. Id. at 6.
39. HAMILTON'S BLESSING, supra note 22, at 39. As is evidenced in a later section, the
monitoring function of the NYSE and of the great investment banks provided a
proxy for control that induced domestic and foreign investors to flood the United
States with capital in the 19th century.
40. Emerging Financial Markets, supra note 22, at 8-9.
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A. PARTNERSHIPS BEFORE THE ADVENT OF THE RAILROADS
4 1
Before railroads burst on the scene and knitted the nation together,
creating national markets and gigantic businesses, 19th century businesses
were predominately proprietorships and partnerships with a smattering
of non-banking corporations. Without railroads or canals, business size
was also limited. The availability of capital was restricted as proprietors
and partners relied on their personal credit and that of friends and neigh-
bors.42 Until corporate law solved the lock-up problem, businesses were
extremely fragile because the owners could withdraw their personal capi-
tal-starting a competitor or just ending the business. Obviously, this fra-
gility made it difficult to raise capital for ventures of any size because the
odds were that someone, for any reason, might withdraw funds and set
the house tumbling.
Partnerships were relatively small businesses that were owned and con-
trolled by a small number of people. The partners had intensely personal
relationships with their employees, community, creditors, and their prod-
uct. Actually, if one thinks about the law of partnership, the partners
were the business. There was a certain transparency in that, if one was a
partner, he was the business. His credit was the business's credit; his
botched, defective, or dangerous product was his liability. There really
was no separation of interest at that particular time. The drawback, of
course, was unlimited liability, which hampered credit and the ability to
expand. Partnerships had another drawback as well-they typically ter-
minated upon the death, retirement, or withdrawal of partners. The Uni-
form Partnership Act (1914) codified the common law defaults and
practices.43 Indeed, even the most recent version of the Act (1997) still
preserves these default terminations but converts them to a more benign
dissociation that ends the partner's relationship with the firm without de-
stroying the firm. 44 Nonetheless, dissociation itself contains some signifi-
cant problems. The dissociating partner will take her skills and capital
with her when she leaves. Further, informal threats of dissociation, while
frowned upon if in bad faith, can replicate the earlier problem. 45
Notwithstanding their fragility, partnerships were frequently chosen for
business operations because they "reduced particular classes of transac-
tion costs, mitigated certain types of opportunism, facilitated monitoring,
41. Portions of the discussion in this section are adapted from Partner to Plutocrat,
supra note 8, at 539-42.
42. Until corporate law solved the lock-up problem, businesses were extremely fragile
because the owners could withdraw capital-starting a competitor or just ending
the business. Obviously, this fragility made it difficult to raise capital for ventures
of any size because the odds were that someone, for any reason, might withdraw
funds and set the house tumbling.
43. See UNIF. P'SHIP ACr (1914).
44. See UNIF. P'SHIp Acr (amended 1997).
45. See UNIF. P'sHip Acr (1914).
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or promoted certain types of direction-taking and giving."'46 As we will
see with the railroads, their innovative management structure would re-
duce transaction costs and provide excellent monitoring, going a long way
toward solving the agency problem.47
In addition, partnerships gave the partners a sense of ownership and
control. Indeed, the common default was that all partners managed the
business and shared the profits of the enterprise. This was all for the
good, but partnerships had another major disadvantage-hold-ups by
partners, business suppliers, and creditors. 48 Since creditors and suppliers
were not members of the firm, the partnership had to contract with these
important persons to protect its livelihood. Imperfect contracts empow-
ered creditors and suppliers to extort rents from the productive partner-
ship. On the other hand, the modern corporation, with its access to large
pools of capital, has the ability to capture these resources through hori-
zontal and vertical integration, eliminating some of these hold-up
opportunities. 49
Hold-ups occurred because, under partnership law of the 19th and
most of the 20th centuries, partners could threaten the firm's existence by
withdrawing or threatening to withdraw. Bodenhorn found that partners
were sometimes forced to accept disadvantageous terms after they had
invested because the partnership relation or specific sunk assets exposed
the partners to the opportunistic behavior of their co-investors.50
The fear of "hold-up can lead to inefficiently low levels of invest-
ment. '' 51 Moreover, hold-ups can occur at any time, "from initial negotia-
tions in forming a partnership to one partner threatening premature
liquidation if the other refuses to concede a portion of his or her share of
the firm's profits. '52 Ultimately, the combination of asset specificity53
and imperfect contracts54 will establish the greatest potential for hold-
46. Howard Bodenhorn, Partnership and Hold-Up in Early America 16 (Nat'l Bureau
of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 8814, 2002), available at http://www.nber.
org/papers/w8814 [hereinafter Partnership and Hold-Up].
47. Accurate financial records, pushed for by investors, brokers, and investment bank-
ers would provide greater transparency. Investment bankers, because they repre-
sented pools of capital and corporations, could use their market power to enforce
norms.
48. Partnership and Hold-Up, supra note 46, at 8-9.
49. In more modern times, the American conglomerate corporation of the 1960s was
able to use its market power and access to credit and markets to hinder hold-ups.
50. Partnership and Hold-Up, supra note 46, at 7.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 8.
53. Four types of asset specificity include: site specificity; physical asset specificity;
human asset specificity; and dedicated assets. Oliver E. Williamson, Symposium:
1982 Merger Guidelines: Vertical Merger Guidelines: Interpreting the 1982 Reforms,
71 CALIF. L. REv. 604, 613-14 (1983).
54. The more complex the transaction, the more likely possible contingencies will not
be realized. These unforeseen contingencies could create problems of hold-up af-
ter the partnership is formed if partners are not able to reach agreement. For
example, if one partner has leverage over the others, he could force them to give
into his terms or face dissolution of the partnership.
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ups.55
Thus, partnerships are generally not found in large businesses where
the monitoring of products or services can be quantified by scientific
management practices. 56 Hence, the virtue of partnerships in profes-
sional services and other such businesses becomes a drawback when great
businesses must be constructed and other methods of monitoring must be
employed. "[I]f market monitoring is sufficiently reliable, corporations
perform better than partnerships, while if market monitoring is weak,
partnerships are strictly more profitable than corporations. '57
As a result, partnerships, while a natural form of business and one eas-
ily adopted, had significant drawbacks related to fragility, hold-ups, and
unlimited liability. Large businesses were difficult to construct as a part-
nership due to liability, monitoring concerns, and the need for capital and
liquidity. The hold-up problem and the difficulties entailed in liquidating
partnership interests depressed the value of partnership investments.
This devalued limited partnership credit, growth, and the size of the busi-
ness enterprise. The modern business corporation solved many of the
problems inherent in partnership enterprises and gave rise to the creation
of enormous businesses when investors were able to surrender their need
for control, monitoring, ownership, and other partnership attributes, and
were willing to trust the capital markets for their investment security.
The history of the Corliss Steam Engine Company is instructive of how
the newly fashioned corporate form frustrated hold-ups. While first or-
ganized as a partnership in 1847, the venture was reorganized as a corpo-
ration in 1857. George Corliss, the inventor, and Nightingale, another
investor, owned the bulk of the company's stock. When Corliss sought to
have the firm issue more stock to his brother (thereby giving George ef-
fective control of the company), Nightingale refused to reduce his hold-
ings and blocked other efforts that would have rendered him a minority
owner. Had the company been a partnership, George could have dis-
solved the venture quite easily. 58 As it was, George ultimately prevailed
55. Recent studies of corporate governance recognize that stakeholders
other than shareholders (i.e., suppliers, customers, neighbors and em-
ployees) make investments specific to their relationship with a firm .....
At the same time, the firm may undertake specific investments to attract
and accommodate employees, neighbors, suppliers and customers. In
the absence of complete contracts, one party can threaten to terminate
the relationship and destroy the value of the sunk asset as a bargaining
ploy to capture a greater share of the gains from trade. This is the es-
sence of hold-up.
Partnership and Hold-Up, supra note 46, at 8-9.
56. See supra Section V discussing modern management techniques and structures pio-
neered by American railroads.
57. Jonathan Levin & Steven Tadelis, A Theory of Partnerships 2 (Stanford Inst. for
Econ. Policy Research Working Paper No. 244, 2002), available at http://papers.
ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract id=311159.
58. This might have proven to have been a wrongful dissolution if his dissolution was
taken to capture the value of the company, but that is another story.
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because he retained personal control of the patents.59 Nevertheless, the
Corliss tale demonstrates that corporate investors have greater protection
against hold-ups and helps to explain why corporations became such an
important institution.
B. BUSINESS CORPORATIONS BEFORE THE COMING OF RAILROADS 60
The business corporation was the unique creation of American
lawmakers during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries,
made by state legislatures that chartered corporations, the state
courts that created a body of decisional law for their internal govern-
ance, and the Supreme Court that defined the institution by estab-
lishing its relationship to the states. What these lawmaking
institutions discovered was that the corporate form, used in England
and the colonies to organize charitable and public institutions, could
be refashioned to suit the special needs of American entrepreneurs.
New production technology, especially in textiles, required large cap-
ital investment. In a country where the government did not regularly
finance production ventures and where private resources of individu-
als were inadequate to the need, broad-based stock ownership made
imminent sense, especially when it was accompanied by centralized
management, a key feature of corporate form. Armed with immor-
tality granted by its charter, unlike the earlier joint-stock companies
organized for a single venture, and limited liability, provided gradu-
ally during this period of legislative enactment, the corporation was
an increasingly attractive investment vehicle for entrepreneurs, pro-
vided the investment could be secured against state regulation.61
While legislatures regularly tried to curb the wealth and power of cor-
porations,62 the need for capital and the shift in public attitude away from
suspicion of corporations to enthusiasm led to a relaxation of state regu-
lation in the 19th century.63 Legislatures removed restrictions or relaxed
them to further the interests of emerging large corporations.64 Corpora-
tions now possessed the power and legal theory to capture even more
power and wealth. With the rise of general incorporation laws (1840-
1850s),65 the foundation was laid for the rise of Big Business, which
59. Naomi R. Lamoreaux, Partnerships, Corporations, and the Theory of the Firm, 88
AM. ECON. REv. 66, 69 (1998).
60. Portions of the discussion in this section are adapted from Partner to Plutocrat,
supra note 8, at 542-46.
61. R. KENT NEWMYER, JOHN MARSHALL AND THE HEROIC AGE OF THE SUPREME
COURT 246-47 (LSU Press 2001) [hereinafter JOHN MARSHALL].
62. See Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 548-56 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing in part) (discussing various state restrictions upon corporations).
63. Kelvin H. Dickinson, Partners in a Corporate Cloak: The Emergence and Legiti-
macy of the Incorporated Partnership, 33 AM. U. L. REV. 559, 574 (1984); see also
JAMES W. ELY, JR., RAILROADS & AMERICAN LAW 18 (Univ. Press of Kansas
2001) [hereinafter RAILROADS & AMERICAN LAW].
64. RAILROADS & AMERICAN LAW, supra note 63, at 16.
65. Prior to general incorporation laws, investors were required to seek specific char-
ters from the legislature to incorporate. This was a vestige of earlier English prac-
tice where the Crown and, later, Parliament chartered corporations. Legislative
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would rely on the vibrant and emerging capital markets.
Corporations also spurred industrialization and urbanization. In the
first half of the 19th century, America was largely agricultural; in 1850, 65
percent of workers were in agricultural occupations. 66 Manufacturing
was present in small firms. For instance, in 1832, only 106 manufacturers
had assets greater than $100,000.67 But industrialization was on the rise,
and urbanization was increasing. Reliable transport would accelerate
those critical trends.
Before the railroad network created the national market, many firms
conducted their business in the partnership form. The advantages of the
corporate form were not as clear as they seem now. Fixed capital for
manufacturing ventures was not large. Entrepreneurs often could raise
funds from neighbors, friends, and family. Firm earnings were also a
good source of capital (with no income tax, partnerships could retain
earnings and reinvest, something that is rare in modern life due to the
biases of the tax code that encourage partnerships to distribute profits).
Corporations could raise more capital due to their advantages of limited
liability and continuity of life.68 But technology had not yet reached the
point where economies of scale would be obtained through large enter-
prises. Nor were there national markets to support large businesses. As
a result, manufacturers and other businesses confronted shallow capital
markets that posed high risks for business ventures. Stockholders often
participated in the firm to maintain control and ensure a distribution of
profits. 69 Indeed, some corporations may have been limited in their
search for capital because the limited liability enjoyed by investors took
away further sources of collateral.70
Without national markets and risky capital pools for their ventures,
businesses tended to stay close to home and remained small. The family
firm dominated even larger manufacturing enterprises like mills, etc.,
even if the firm had several manufacturing sites. The family management
was close enough to the workers and subordinate supervisors to effec-
tively run these small enterprises without the need for massive amounts
chartering was a check designed to exert political control over potentially danger-
ous monopolies. In practice it became a cumbersome nuisance, and a procedure
susceptible to bribes and logrolling. With general incorporation laws in place, cor-
porations were standard organizations that could be employed by anyone meeting
the requirements and agreeing to follow the strictures. Thus, the corporation was
democratized and became an excellent vehicle for running businesses.
66. Nonetheless, manufacturing industries "were probably the most important in the
United States at the time." William C. Kessler, A Statistical Study of the New York
General Incorporation Act of 1811, 48 J. POL. ECON. 877, 880 (1940).
67. Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, The Rise of the Regulatory State, 41 J.
ECON. LIT. 401, 413 (2003).
68. Because corporations were also not subject to any income tax they could retain
earnings easily for expansion. The ability to lock in capital was critical. See Lock-
ing in Capital, supra note 9.
69. Naomi R. Lamoreaux, The Partnership Form of Organization: Its Popularity in
Early-Nineteenth-Century Boston, in COLOSSus: How THE CORPORATION
CHANGED AMERICA 45, 51-52 (Jack Beatty ed., Broadway Books 2000).
70. Id.
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of capital or a large number of investors. Consequently, these businesses
continued as family corporations with active management by the family
member shareholders. In effect, they conducted business like incorpo-
rated partnerships 7 1
C. CORPORATE LAW LOCKS-IN CAPITAL
7 2
As we have seen, partnerships, by their very nature, permitted inves-
tors to pull out capital, even on a whim. This attribute limited the
amount of capital that could be raised and thus limited enterprise size.
Corporate law changed all that through the fiction of the corporate
personality. Corporations are treated as distinct entities, separate and
apart from their owners, the shareholders. 73 Corporations enjoy domin-
ion over their assets. The board of directors of the corporation manages
the business of the corporation. Directors are neither agents for the
shareholders nor can they function individually as agents for the corpora-
tion. Directors collectively make investment decisions and decide
whether to declare dividends. Neither the directors alone nor the share-
holders can liquidate the corporation. They must act jointly. And the law
often provided for supermajorities for critical decisions such as mergers
and dissolutions.
Thus, once funds were committed to the corporation for investment by
purchasing shares, the individual investor, merely as a shareholder,
lacked power over the assets at risk. Further, corporation law made it
difficult for corporations to be dissolved. Investors could not just pull
their money out and leave as they could in partnerships. Indeed, even
when the investors were at loggerheads, courts were often reluctant to
judicially dissolve the corporations. Taken as a whole, the new corporate
structure, with theoretical immortality, could lock-in investors' capital
forever. These funds, under the control of the directors, could then be
deployed to build great enterprises.
Debt creditors such as bondholders and banks could also rely on the
lock-in-they could have reasonable certainty that the enterprise would
be operated long enough to retire the debt. Further, the assets provided
collateral for the creditor and were not as easily converted by investor-
shareholders as they would be in partnerships. The 19th century model
71. Traditionally merchants had used the bonds of kinship and friendship to
cement far-flung ventures. The formal organization structures character-
istic of twentieth-century businesses were then unknown. Before 1860
even the largest of manufacturing corporations had only one or two fac-
tories, normally located in single place. Thus the manager of a cotton
mill could view his entire establishment in an hour or two and found no
need for elaborate systems to supervise subordinates.
STEPHEN SALSBURY, THE STATE, THE INVESTOR, AND THE RAILROAD: THE Bos-
TON & ALBANY, 1825-1867 299 (Harvard Univ. Press 1967) [hereinafter BOSTON &
ALBANY].
72. Locking in Capital, supra note 9, describes the history of this important feature.
73. JOHN MARSHALL, supra note 61, at 246-47.
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thus proved to be a fine vehicle for amassing huge amounts of capital and
retaining long-term control over it.
This lock-in of capital would provide the funds necessary to build great
industries. But investors would only be willing to part with their money if
some reasonable degree of security and liquidity could be obtained. That
liquidity would come from general availability of shares at favorable
prices, enticing investment, and providing a market for those wishing to
dispose of their shares. The key to this liquidity is a capital market that
facilitates turnover, and hence, liquidity. Next, the article describes the
liquidity found in plutocratic ownership of shares. Then the railroad his-
tory will show how plutocratic shareholding spreads liquidity and wealth.
D. PLUTOCRATIC OWNERSHIP FUNDS LIQUID CAPITAL MARKETS
Plutocratic ownership is basically the idea of one vote per share.74 This
was a marked departure from the initial common law model of one vote
per investor (of course, based upon partnership law). Over the first half
of the 19th century corporation control evolved from the common law
model to the plutocratic model. At first, this seems to subvert the inter-
ests of the small investor, making the capital market illiquid, because vot-
ing power (for directors), and hence control, is concentrated in the hands
of those with the most shares. There is paradox at work here because
plutocratic shareholding is a key to deep and broad capital markets.75
This section describes briefly the operation of those markets. The next
section shows how railroads' massive need of capital created the modern
plutocratic market.
The 19th century capital markets of Europe and America were not as
deep or broad as modern markets. They were susceptible to major run-
ups, crashes, and manipulation. Yet they continued to attract saved
74. See Colleen A. Dunlavy, Corporate Governance in Late 19th-Century Europe and
the US.: The Case of Shareholder Voting Rights, in COMPARATIVE CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE: THE STATE OF THE ART AND EMERGING RESEARCH 3, 5-39 (Ox-
ford Univ. Press 1998); Colleen A. Dunlavy, Corporate Democracy: Stockholder
Voting Rights in Nineteenth-Century American and Prussian Railroad Corpora-
tions, in INSTITUTIONS IN THE TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRIES:
STATE AND PRIVATE ACTORS IN THE MAKING OF INSTITUTIONAL PATTERNS, 1850-
1900 33-60 (Sci. History Publications 1999); Colleen A. Dunlavy, From Citizens to
Plutocrats: Nineteenth-Century Shareholder Voting Rights and Theories of the Cor-
poration, in CONSTRUCTING CORPORATE AMERICA: HISTORY, POLITICS, CULTURE
66-93 (Kenneth Lipartito & David B. Sicilia eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2004).
75. English and American capital markets were home to atomistic shareholdings. The
result has been a higher market capitalization for firms than those in markets
where large block holders-families or corporations-dominate. The dispersed
nature of holdings in Anglo-Saxon markets produces greater liquidity, diversifica-
tion, and, ultimately higher value. Details on the contrasting , bank-based indus-
trial development may be found in Wilfried Feldenkirchen, Banking and Economic
Growth: Banks and Industry in Germany in the Nineteenth Century and their
Changing Relationship During Industrialization, in GERMAN INDUSTRY AND GER-
MAN INDUSTRIALIZATION: ESSAYS IN GERMAN ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS HIS-
TORY IN THE NINETEENTH AND TWENTIETH CENTURIES 116-47 (W.R. Lee ed.,
Routledge 1991).
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money. As Europeans and Americans saved money, they created capital
surpluses and invested through developing financial intermediaries. 76
The capital pools became deeper, wider, richer, and better
funded?veritable seas of money. With depth and breadth offered by the
variety of instruments and liquidity available to investors, these modern
capital pools (both debt and equity securities) provide safety and liquidity
while dampening wild fluctuations. 77
Developed capital markets ultimately reduce the cost of capital.
Money is merely a vital and precious commodity and is subject to the
same rules as other commodities. In free capital markets, when many
investors bring their money to invest, the price of money drops. In this
way, investment money may appear to be fungible, like corn, in the clas-
sic microeconomics demonstration of supply and demand curves. While
it is true that a dollar is a dollar, different investor demands and capital
needs will create price differentiation. For example, equity demands a
higher return than debt in most instances because equity is subordinate to
debt and is subject to the considerable whims of management. Neverthe-
less, en gross the capital markets bring together huge capital pools. Com-
petition for investments among these pools then makes money cheaper
and decreases the cost of doing business.
An intriguing and fundamental paradox is that when capital markets
are awash with cash, the price of equity and debt capital drops. This li-
quidity lowers the return on banks and other corporate lenders as they
compete to make loans. Yet when technology, innovation, and productiv-
ity abound, the lower cost of capital fuels expansion. Equity values rise,
yet both debt capital and equity capital remain competitive and can lead
to further increases in market value. This rise in equity value expands the
capital base and leads to greater competition for both debt and equity
investors. Thus, a strong equity and debt market further lowers the cost
of capital and continues to lead the economic expansion. Critical to suc-
cessful capital markets is the fungibility of investments, provided by rela-
tively small denominations of share and bond prices. These are found in
plutocratic markets such as those of mid-19th century America. The next
section will describe how railroads created these liquid capital markets.
IV. RAILROADS MANDATE THE PLUTOCRATIC MODEL
AND ARE BUILT BIT-BY-BIT, SHARE-BY-SHARE 78
While the railroads' insatiable need of capital dictated the plutocratic
model, dispersed shareholding was in evidence before railroads were in
76. Banks, insurance companies, and merchant banks all played major roles as they
funded investments from the savings of their clients.
77. Dampening, not eliminating. We still have had the dot-com/September 11 crash
(2000-2003), the recent Asian Flu (1997), and the 1987 stock market crash that
scared many of us! But the fast recovery of the markets in these instances further
proves their depth and strength.
78. Portions of the discussion in this section are adapted from Partner to Plutocrat,
supra note 8, at 549-55.
2006] DISPERSED CAPITAL AND MORAL AUTHORITY 321
ascendancy. The Boston Manufacturing Company of 1813 was the first
important enterprise to be organized along plutocratic lines with the
modern separation of ownership from management. Although quite
small by modern standards, it had the characteristics of later corporate
giants. In 1830, no one held more than 8.5 percent of the stock. By 1850,
there were 123 shareholders, the largest owning 8.5 percent. Manage-
ment as a group only held 11 percent.79
American railroads demanded massive amounts of capital and new fi-
nancing methods were required to build them. While construction was
cheaper than canals, their vast size and scope was beyond the resources of
families and individuals to fund them.8 0
Canals, and later the railroads, conquered the distances of the conti-
nent.81 That conquest fueled America's industrial revolution and un-
leashed demands for goods, services, and speed.82 With their expansive
networks, the management of railroads mandated a departure from the
common law and prudent mean models. 83 The railroads, by linking the
urban areas to the hinterlands and knitting regions together, drastically
reduced transportation costs, which in turn led to the growth of large ur-
ban areas and gigantic industries to provide for America's burgeoning
population.
The histories of the Boston & Albany Railroad (B&A), circa 1825-
1867, and the Erie Railroad84 demonstrate how the movement toward
79. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 10-11 (Rev. ed., New York, Harcourt, Brace & World 1932).
80. JOHN STEELE GORDON, THE GREAT GAME: THE EMERGENCE OF WALL STREET
As A WORLD POWER, 1653-2000 76 (1999) [hereinafter THE GREAT GAME].
81. Jack Beatty, Toward Scale and Scope, in COLOSSUS: How THE CORPORATION
CHANGED AMERICA 56, 63 (Jack Beatty ed., Broadway Books 2000).
82. Railroads had a profound influence on all aspects of American law and culture.
See RAILROADS & AMERICAN LAW, supra note 63.
83. The prudent mean model (see Corporate Governance in Late 19th-Century Europe
and the U.S.: The Case of Shareholder Voting Rights, supra note 74; Corporate De-
mocracy: Stockholder Voting Rights in Nineteenth-Century American and Prussian
Railroad Corporations, supra note 74; From Citizens to Plutocrats: Nineteenth-Cen-
tury Shareholder Voting Rights and Theories of the Corporation, supra note 74) was
a transition method of corporate governance (between the common law model and
the plutocratic model) that used proportionate representation to prevent any one
shareholder or group of shareholders from dominating the entity. For example, a
shareholder might enjoy one vote per share for the first ten shares owned; eleven
to one hundred shares might provide one vote for each ten shares; shareholdings
greater than one hundred shares might yield one vote for each additional hundred
shares. The First Bank of the United States employed such a scheme. ALEXAN-
DER HAMILTON, Report on a National Bank, December 13, 1970, in WRITINGS 575,
598 (Joanne B. Freeman ed., Columbia Univ. Press 2001) (1961). Modern practice
sometimes uses the prudent mean to frustrate takeovers. See generally Providence
& Worcester Co. v. Baker, 378 A.2d 121 (Del. 1977); see also Stroh v. Blackhawk
Holding Corp., 272 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 1971).
84. I will use the Erie Railroad and Erie Railway interchangeably in this article. The
corporation used several variations of those names during its storied life. The Erie
gives us a type of two-fer because it pioneered modern management. Attacks on
the Erie by speculators in the 1860s and 1870s (the Erie Railway and Susquehanna
Wars) branded the Erie a harlot and ushered in an era of monitoring by Morgan
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plutocratic control85 was a result of the immense capital needs of the
projects, as well as the need for sophisticated management that could ef-
fectively monitor outputs over vast distances. The management revolu-
tion that resulted in the modern, hierarchical organization transformed
American business and fit exactly within the confines of centralized man-
agement, directed by elected boards of directors, who remained responsi-
ble to atomistic shareholders through fiduciary duties. First, let us
examine the B&A.86
The American Revolution had disrupted trading patterns. Americans
no longer clung to the seaboard. Port cities like New York, Boston, Phila-
delphia, and Baltimore sought to maintain their commercial importance
with links to the developing hinterlands. New York State built the Erie
Canal; Baltimore promoted the Baltimore & Ohio in 1827; and Penn-
sylvania constructed a railroad and canal system through the Alleghenies
by 1834.87 With the completion of the Erie Canal, New York State's pop-
ulation doubled from 1 million to 2 million people (1810-1830).88 Inter-
nal improvements were the crucial 19th century network that connected
regions and developed the national economy. 89
Prior to the Boston & Worcester 90 charter, major public improvements,
such as the Erie Canal, the Pennsylvania system of internal improve-
ments, and the Ohio canals, were publicly financed enterprises. Even the
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company had substantial government
backing. 91
The B&A was representative of the switch from predominately public
financing for internal improvements to major reliance on private capi-
tal. 92 This movement to private financing created greater diversification
and others. Without the Erie, modern finance, management, and eventually moni-
toring would have been very different indeed.
85. See Corporate Governance in Late 19th-Century Europe and the U.S.: The Case of
Shareholder Voting Rights, supra note 74, at 5-39; Corporate Democracy: Stock-
holder Voting Rights in Nineteenth-Century American and Prussian Railroad Cor-
porations, supra note 74, at 33-60; From Citizens to Plutocrats: Nineteenth-Century
Shareholder Voting Rights and Theories of the Corporation, supra note 74, at 66-93.
86. The railroads comprising the B&A will be referred to as the B&A, the Boston &
Worcester, and the Western Road (the latter two were the predecessors of the
B&A rail network).
87. THE BOSTON & ALBANY, supra note 71, at 1-2; RAILROADS & AMERICAN LAW,
supra note 63, at 1-2.
88. THE BOSTON & ALBANY, supra note 71, at 2.
89. Id.
90. The Boston & Worcester was a component of the B&A.
91. "The city of Baltimore, for instance, invested heavily in the stock of the Baltimore
and Ohio Railroad. One authority has estimated that before the Civil War, local
governments spent more than $125 million on internal improvements, the largest
share which went for rail projects." RAILROADS & AMERICAN LAW, supra note 63,
at 25 (footnotes omitted).
92. THE BOSTON & ALBANY, supra note 71, at 80. While reliant upon private capital
for railroad construction, a significant public component remained with cities,
towns, counties, villages, and states subscribing for shares or bonds. The United
States used land grants to foster the transcontinental rails. And, American and
British capital markets owe their origin to the monetizing of their respective na-
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in the capital markets by offering private securities to complement gov-
ernment bonds, and quickly led to the separation of ownership from man-
agement in the great corporations, like the railroads.
The B&A was created to funnel agricultural goods from the west to
Boston and preserve its position as a major commercial center and port.
When it was finished in 1842, it had a total capitalization of $9 million
(two-thirds provided by the government). 93 State support was needed
because of the Panic of 1837, a national crisis that crippled credit. While
Massachusetts' private capital for the venture was substantial, it was the
political power of that private capital that convinced the government to
back the project. The B&A proved to be a very good investment; it paid
6 percent within three years of completion.94
To continue construction to the west, the Boston & Worcester issued
10,000 shares at $100 par to bring in small investors. 95 Prior to this issue,
previous large projects like the Lowell and Springfield mills sold shares at
$1,000 par (a substantial amount that limited investments to the very
wealthy and made them illiquid). These earlier industrial projects were
also governed by the prudent mean.96
The B&A's construction broke away from that mold. B&A shares
were sold in subscriptions of $10 and $20 installments to small investors.
The company's charter required annual reports to the General Court and
committees of the legislature to protect the public. To further promote
construction, promoters sold shares for as little as $1 down for the first
assessment, with subsequent assessments in installments of $20 or $30.97
Thus, the B&A sought a very broad base of investors, which resulted in
widely dispersed holdings. B&A shares were soon dispersed afar as a
primitive secondary market developed. By 1835, New Yorkers controlled
45 percent of all shares of the B&A on the NYSE.98 The promoters had
developed a rate structure that met the investors' needs. Six percent was
the annual dividend. 99 By 1837, the road had already paid two dividends
of 8 percent.10 0 The road was a stunning success!
tional debts, which achieved fiscal strength for the state as well funding for com-
mercial and industrial enterprises.
93. RAILROADS & AMERICAN LAW, supra note 63, at 32.
94. Id.
95. THE BOSTON & ALBANY, supra note 71, at 81-82.
96. Id. The prudent mean was a method of control that utilized proportionate voting.
It was a measure between the Common Law model and the plutocratic model. For
extensive research on the development of business governance in the 19th century,
see Corporate Governance in Late 19th-Century Europe and the U.S.: The Case of
Shareholder Voting Rights, supra note 74; Corporate Democracy: Stockholder Vot-
ing Rights in Nineteenth-Century American and Prussian Railroad Corporations,
supra note 74; From Citizens to Plutocrats: Nineteenth-Century Shareholder Voting
Rights and Theories of the Corporation, supra note 74.
97. THE BOSTON & ALBANY, supra note 71, at 81-82.
98. Id. at 96.
99. Id. at 125.
100. Id. at 132.
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Railroad construction continued unabated. The Western Road was fi-
nanced with a subscription of 2,800 shares. While there was wide-scale
distribution, many investors held less than ten shares; yet, 100 investors
owned 40 percent of the stock. The Boston industrial community sub-
scribed heavily and purchased a $5 million assessment. This permitted
the redemption of state financing scrip. 10 1 Contemporaneously, promot-
ers appealed to foreign capital (mainly British). But the state remained
involved in this mixed enterprise. The Commonwealth was used to mar-
ket loans. Private loans in 1838 required 8 percent to 12 percent interest.
With Massachusetts' backing, the rate dropped to 5 percent. 10 2 A sinking
fund was established to retire the debt, and the British merchant bankers
Baring Brothers invested $1,890,000 from 1838-1839.103 Barings sold part
of their investment to subscribers ($1.2 million at 3.25 percent above
par).10 4 By 1842, the Western Railroad was capitalized as follows: stock-
$3 million ($1 million owned by the state) and bonds-$5 million ($4 mil-
lion by the state and $1 million by the City of Albany). The Boston &
Worcester was all stock, privately held, comprising $2,700,000.105 Thus,
as a corporation imbued with a public purpose, the B&A was successfully
financed with a mixture of private and public capital.
These railroads radically increased the wealth of the communities they
connected. This in turn increased the frenzy of railroad fever and promo-
tion. Nonetheless, railroads were good investments. In 1841 to 1843, to
finance extensive capital improvements, the Boston & Worcester sold
$700,000 worth of stock. Much of the stock was sold above par to inves-
tors demanding the stock. The railroad's stock had moved from a specu-
lative investment to a blue chip in a ten-year period. 10 6 The Western was
a great undertaking, greater than other industrial enterprises (save rail-
roads in the 1850s).107
By 1842, its 160 miles of main line had absorbed more than
$7,000,000, and by 1854 its capital was $10,000,000. By contrast even
the Erie Canal, which was more than 360 miles long, cost only
$7,000,000; and only the biggest industrial concerns had as much cap-
ital as $500,000. Even in 1850 in textiles, the most advanced segment
of industry, only forty-one American factories had a capitalization of
$250,000 or more.108
The Boston & Worcester became a major railroad that spurred the
economy of Massachusetts and the region. It met its capital needs by
relying on a creative mixture of private and public finance. The venture
101. Id. at 140-43.
102. Id. at 147.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 148-149.
105. Id. at 32.
106. Id. at 215.
107. Id. at 299.
108. Id.
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was so successful that it attracted investors from New England, New
York, and Europe within a short period of time.
The B&A's growth also required new management structures that sup-
ported the widely dispersed owners and far-flung managers. The direc-
tors, president, and chief engineers created a multi-divisional authority to
run the railroad. This new-fangled management structure substituted bu-
reaucracy for friendship and kinship. Formal lines of authority were cre-
ated, as well as elaborate reporting systems that enabled top managers to
make efficient and accurate decisions. The informal management prac-
tices of the partnership and family-owned businesses had given way to a
more scientific, bureaucratic structure that would benefit from the new
system of monitoring and controls.10 9 The rise of this management model
is detailed in the next section where the Erie Railroad's contributions are
reviewed.
V. MODERN MANAGEMENT SUPERVISES THE EMPIRE: THE
ERIE RAILROAD MODEL 110
The Erie Railroad's revolutionary bureaucratic management structure
set a precedent for the other railroads. The divisional model paved the
way for other great industrial corporations. This shift from hands-on,
owner management of industrial enterprise to administration by profes-
sional managers supports the shift from the common law model of man-
agement to the plutocratic model. The professional managers provided
governance and controls that were beyond the ken of the typical, entre-
preneur-owned industrial corporation in the mid-1800s. Professional
management, informed by agency law and fiduciary duties, was a vital
proxy for the remote, dispersed shareholder-owners.
As illustrated above, before the advent of railroads, even corporate in-
dustrial concerns were modeled after partnerships. There was a limited
need for capital and owner management provided some protections for
agency problems. Personal networks of kinship and friendship usually
managed these commercial enterprises1 1' and provided the necessary
amounts of credit. Most critical was the question of whether or not a
particular person could be trusted. By the 1840s and 1850s, industrializa-
tion and commercialization were proceeding apace and railroads were the
reason. Railroad construction and operations were the foundation. The
corporate form was essential for its success:
While the first industrial revolution produced a number of incorpo-
rated factories, canals, turnpikes, and banks, many of these enter-
prises could have been, and often were, conducted successfully as
109. Id.
110. Portions of the discussion in this section are adapted from Partner to Plutocrat,
supra note 8, at 553-59.
111. RICHARD S. TEDLOW, THE RISE OF THE AMERICAN BUSINESS CORPORATION 8-9
(Harwood Academic Publishing 1991) [hereinafter AMERICAN BUSINESS
CORPORATION].
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partnerships or proprietorships. By contrast, during the second in-
dustrial revolution, the corporate form proved to be absolutely es-
sential. It was a very useful way to aggregate the unprecedented
amount of money required to construct large-scale railroads, facto-
ries, mills, refineries, and pipelines, and was also an extremely effec-
tive device for administering the affairs of these enterprises. From a
primarily legal construct, with quasi-public functions, the corporation
now evolved into and inward-looking, private, and very complex or-
ganizational hierarchy - a managerial revolution within the private
sector.1
12
Railroads were the first great modern businesses. To manage them
properly and to raise the capital needed for their enterprise, complex or-
ganizations were created. These enterprises consumed vast amounts of
money. By 1859, private railroad securities amounted to $1.1 billion.1 13
In contrast, canals built from 1815-1860 cost about $188 million and about
three-quarters of the investment was public. 114 By 1850, railroad securi-
ties offered investors in the public markets a degree of security. Railroad
finance fueled the volume growth of the exchanges.
The Erie Railroad led the way and spearheaded the managerial revolu-
tion. While traditional family businesses, including industrial ones, could
rely on history and personal relations for management, railroads had
large territories that could only be managed by a complex management
structure. By 1855, the Erie was the third-largest road in the United
States with operating expenses three times that of the Western (a subsidi-
ary of the B&A). Daniel McCallum, the Erie's very able superintendent,
realized that supervision and management of the road would have to be
restructured from the traditional model of hands-on knowledge by the
manager or superintendent.
McCallum composed his operating principles, set forth below. It is the
oldest detailed description of how large corporations must be organized.
Here is what he said:
1. A proper division of responsibilities.
2. Sufficient power conferred to enable the same to be fully carried
out, that such responsibilities may be real in their character.
3. The means of knowing whether such responsibilities are faithfully
executed.
4. Great promptness in the report of all derelictions of duty, that
evils may be at once corrected.
5. Such information is to be obtained through a system of daily re-
ports and checks that will not embarrass principal officers, nor
lessen their influence with their subordinates.
112. Id. at 13 n.40 (quoting Thomas K. McCraw, The Evolution of the Corporation in
the United States, in THE U.S. BUSINESS CORPORATION: AN INSTITUTION IN TRAN-
srriON 1, 6-7 (James M. Gustafson & John R. Meyer eds., Cambridge, Mass.: Bal-
linger 1988)).
113. AMERICAN BUSINESS CORPORATION, supra note 111, at 14.
114. Id. at 14.
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6. The adoption of a system, as a whole, which will not only enable
the general superintendent to detect errors immediately, but will
also point out the delinquent.1 15
In order to implement his principles, McCallum created the prototypi-
cal division structure: an organization of four divisions (superintendents)
and two branches.1 1 6 These division and branch line superintendents re-
ported to the general superintendent. The general superintendent then
reported to the company's president. 117 Superintendents were responsi-
ble for the operations and maintenance of their divisions and branches.
The Erie management structure revolutionized the railroad business by
standardizing procedures and policies. The division heads functioned as
subordinate CEOs. As a result, the superintendents could give their at-
tention to problems and bring their personal knowledge to the tasks at
hand while resolving issues in accord with Erie's policies and program.
(See Figure 1 in the Appendix for a diagram of the Erie management
structure.)
The Erie model proved to be so successful that it was copied by other
large industries such as iron and steel, the telegraph, and the like. The
divisional management structure was a creative method of solving the
monitoring problem once businesses reached the size of railroads and
steel mills. This solution permitted corporations to grow to gigantic size
because management and control could now be professionalized. This
professionalism by management proxy spurred the separation of owner-
ship from control in the large, publicly held companies.
Railroads created ancillary industries like iron and steel mills. The suc-
cess of railroads was linked to American growth and prosperity. Yet
these vital companies and their stocks and bonds were prey for capricious
and talented Wall Street predators. The next section illustrates the
abuses of the mid-century capital markets. Then, the penultimate section
shows how the operations of the capital markets monitored the public
companies while providing a solution to the partnership and small busi-
ness hold-up problem that vexed businesses.
VI. THE WILD RIDE OF THE ROBBER BARONS-THEIR
MARKETS AND RAMPANT SPECULATION 118
It seems almost counterintuitive that large capital markets can provide
dispersed investors with a sufficient measure of security to overcome the
115. Id. at 17.
116. Id. at 17, 18.
117. Id. at 18.
118. Portions of the discussion in this section are adapted from Investor Power, supra
note 11, at 92-97. For an excellent discussion of corners in the emerging U.S.
market and illiquidity that follows them, see Franklin Allen, Nippon Life Professor
of Finance and Professor of Economics, Department of Finance, The Wharton
School of the University of Pennsylvania, Lubomir P. Litov, Doctoral Student,
Leonard Stern School of Business, NYU, & Jianping Mei, Associate Professor of
Finance, Leonard Stern School of Business, NYU, Western Finance Association
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hold-up problem and monitoring concerns, but they did in the 19th cen-
tury, and the success in resolving these issues was followed by massive
investment in the United States, tremendous growth of businesses and
capital stock, and an increase in the nation's wealth.119
Financial institutions were one key to this transformational growth.' 20
Foreign capital became important in the 1830s. By 1853, approximately
$222 million was due to foreign capital investments (19 percent of Ameri-
can securities). 121 By 1856, the Secretary of the Treasury estimated that
foreign investment in railroads amounted to $83 million.122 After
1850,123 railroads were:
able to raise substantial sums in the European market, and the bulk
of foreign investment came after the Civil War. To raise large sums
of capital, which reached millions of dollars per enterprise, railroad
promoters . . . turned mainly to . . . merchant-capitalists (in the
United States), who were often to be found among the ranks of their
own stockholders. The companies relied on these private capitalists
to help them in placing railroad stocks and bonds, which... were the
first industrial securities to be offered publicly in large volume. In-
deed, they were virtually the only ones until the last decades of the
nineteenth century: ... in the United States, it was only in the 1890s
that manufacturers turned to the stock exchange for outside funds.124
Annual Meetings: Large Investors, Price Manipulation, and Limits to Arbitrage:
An Anatomy of Market Corners (June 18-21, 2002).
119. The American investment capital market developed in a form very simi-
lar to that of the European system, not only because Americans copied
the Europeans, especially the British, but also because the European sys-
tem served as a template. If the Americans wanted to borrow European
finance capital, they would have to offer bonds and other securities simi-
lar to those on the European markets. They would have to deal with
investment bankers like the Rothschilds or the Barings and conform to
the requirements that these conservative bankers proposed.
WILLIAM G. Roy, SOCIALIZING CAPITAL: THE RISE OF THE LARGE INDUSTRIAL
CORPORATION IN AMERICA 136 (Princeton Univ. Press 1997).
In America, monitoring and trust arising from investment relationships were
similar to English practices. Julian R. Franks et al., Ownership: Evolution and
Regulation (ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 09/2003; EFA 2004 Maastricht
Meetings Paper No. 3205; AFA 2003 Washington, DC Meetings, March 25, 2005)
[hereinafter Franks], available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=354381. Franks, Mayer
& Rossi surmised that the dispersed ownership in the English markets was pro-
tected by informal regulation. Modern securities regulation was not introduced
until well into the 20th century, yet English capital markets thrived and provided
sufficient safety for the dispersed shareholders.
120. Banks, trust companies, insurance companies, investment banks, and brokerages
were key intermediaries in the financial markets. Their concurrent development
played a major role in the development of America's capital markets. ENTER-
PRISE, supra note 2, at 318-20.
121. MORGAN, supra note 10, at 71.
122. Id.
123. In the 1850s, railroad investments totaled 6.8 percent of domestic capital stock; by
1860, they totaled 12.7 percent. COLEEN A. DUNLAVY, POLITICS AND INDUSTRI-
ALIZATION: EARLY RAILROADS IN THE UNITED STATES AND PRUSSIA 35
(Princeton Univ. Press 1994).
124. Id. at 34-35.
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The rise of national banks and a financial system that exported capital
to regions and industries that used it wisely aided development. The
transfer of funds from the capital-rich East to the West contributed to the
growth of modern America. Railroads bound the nation together and
spurred the growth of great metropolises such as New York and Chicago.
The urbanization of great cities further accelerated economic growth and
wealth creation as they supported specialization of work. 125 The capital
transfer helped to meet the demand for tools, housing, communication
works, and other infrastructure needs.1 26
Of all the burgeoning American industries, railroads profited from
economies of scale. But they required high maintenance and high capital
costs. 12 7 The tremendous financial needs of the railroads mandated pub-
lic equity markets. And the markets had to be regular or investors would
be scared off.128
Few protections existed for minority shareholders in railroad corpora-
tions.129 "Not only did control groups quickly form, but in some cases the
objective of these blockholders was primarily to manipulate the stock
price of their corporation.' 130 Professor Coffee cites the example of the
battle for control of the Erie Railroad-the "Scarlet Lady of Wall
Street. "131
125. For a good history of this rail-driven urban growth, see SARAH H. GORDON, PAS-
SAGE To UNION: How THE RAILROADS TRANSFORMED AMERICAN LIFE, 1829-
1929 267-301 (Ivan R. Dee 1990).
126. ENTERPRISE, supra note 2, at 312.
127. JOHN STEELE GORDON, THE SCARLET WOMAN OF WALL STREET: JAY GOULD,
JIM FISK, CORNELIUS VANDERBILT, THE ERIE RAILWAY WARS, AND THE BIRTH
OF WALL STREET 124 (Weidenfeld & Nicholson 1988) [hereinafter ERIE RAILWAY
WARS]. Railroad stocks were also good for Wall Street. By 1856, there were 360
railroad stocks traded, 985 bank stocks, hundreds of corporate stocks and
municipals, as well as 75 insurance stocks. THE GREAT GAME, supra note 80, at
87. The variety of investments permitted diversification and increased liquidity
and safety, ultimately lowering the cost of capital. See generally Investor Power,
supra note 11.
128. In the period before the Civil War, many stocks, including industrials, were owned
and traded locally. Hugh Rockoff, Banking and Finance, 1789-1914, in 2 THE
CAMBRIDGE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, THE LONG NINE-
TEENTH CENTURY 679 (Stanley L. Engerman & Robert E. Gallman eds., Cam-
bridge Univ. Press 2000). Regional and local stock exchanges, trading in local
companies sufficed for most industrial needs. Bankers and securities dealers in
their localities sold new issues. This worked well for the moderate capital needs
before railroad construction. CHARLES R. GEISST, WALL STREET: A HISTORY 72-
73 (Oxford Univ. Press 1997). England, of course, had a number of regional ex-
changes. There local knowledge was crucial in vetting companies for new issues.
Franks, supra note 119, at 17-18.
129. During this time frame, English company law also failed to protect minority share-
holders. Franks, supra note 119, at 12. They cite two important cases: Foss v.
Harbottle, 67 Eng. Rep. 189 (1843) (restricting minority shareholder suits for dam-
ages); see also Harben v. Phillips, 23 Ch.D. 14 (1883) (Chancery Decisions) (recog-
nizing no common law right for proxy voting). Both decisions would make it
difficult for minority shareholders to vindicate their rights.
130. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Role of Law and the
State in the Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 YALE L. J. 1, 27 (2001).
131. Id. at 27-28. For other sources, see CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, JR. & HENRY AD-
AMS, CHAPTERS OF ERIE AND OTHER ESSAYS (Jane R. Osgood & Co. 1871) [here-
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The Erie Railway Wars were emblematic of the legal, moral, and finan-
cial chaos of the times and in the markets.132 The battle for control of the
Albany and Susquehanna (a road linking Binghamton to the Albany
gateway to New England) at the annual board of directors' election fea-
tured Cornelius Vanderbilt and his allies against Jay Gould, Jim Fisk, and
their associates. A young J. P. Morgan advised the New York Central
faction (Vanderbilt's forces). 133 Shareholders, lawyers, employees, proxy
holders, process servers, and thugs attended the meeting. The company
treasurer was arrested for stealing the subscription books. After papers
were served and two separate elections held, each with a different victor,
the battle moved to the courts. Morgan had the case tried in the friendly
confines of Delhi, New York, not Albany or New York City, and the trial
judge ruled in his favor on all counts. The Court of Appeals, however,
reversed the decision in its entirety, except on the critical issue of who
had won the election. 134 Grievous harm had been done. Jeremiah Black,
inafter CHAPTERS OF ERIE]; see also ERIE RAILWAY WARS, supra note 127; see
also MAURY KLEIN, THE LIFE AND LEGEND OF JAY GOULD 77-98 (Johns Hop-
kins Univ. Press 1986) [hereinafter JAY GOULD]. While Jay Gould was generally
thought of as a villain by most, his control of the Erie was salubrious, however.
Before Gould, the physical plant was run-down and the debt was staggering.
Gould's astute management rendered the Erie a much stronger property. JAY
GOULD, supra note 131, at 88-102, 115-16, 119-21.
132. Portions of the discussion in this section are adapted from Partner to Plutocrat,
supra note 8, at 560-64.
133. This may have convinced Pierpont Morgan that internecine warfare like the Erie
brawl was no way to run a railroad.
The Morgans [father and son-eds.] hated this kind of warfare, which
played havoc with national with national financial markets and left their
client-investors holding worthless paper. Hoping to transform railroad
securities from high-risk speculations into stable, long-term investments,
they and a few other bankers ... attempted to discipline the industry.
The fact that railroads continually needed huge infusions of capital put
the bankers in a powerful position.
MORGAN, supra note 10, at 134.
Pierpont "saw himself as a proxy for honorable European and American inves-
tors, a tool of transcendent purpose representing the sound men on Wall Street
and in the City." RON CHEROw, THE HOUSE OF MORGAN: AN AMERICAN BANK-
ING DYNASTY AND THE RISE OF MODERN FINANCE 30, 44, 45 (Atlantic Monthly
Press 1990).
Pierpont spent much of his life trying to consolidate railroads, regularize rates,
and manage ruinous competition. MORGAN, supra note 10, at 198 (The heads of
the Wabash, New York Central, and Erie in 1880 met 'with a view of making
permanent running arrangements'-that is, agreeing to divide up traffic rather
than wage war." The Wabash and Erie were Gould roads!) Morgan's quest to
rationalize and consolidate the trunk lines was quashed in N. Sec. Co. v. United
States, 193 U.S. 197 (1907) (applying Sherman Antitrust Act to stock ownership;
dissolving Northern Securities Company, which held the stock of three major
railroads).
The Erie Wars were costly; they gave all participants a black eye. Finally, they
helped to fix the rapacious image of robber barons in the public's eye.
134. The Susquehanna War litigation was both complex and protracted. In People v.
Albany & Susquehanna R.R. Co., 7 Abb. Pr., (n.s.) 265, 38 How. Pr. (n.s.) 228, 1
Lans. 308, 55 Barb. 344 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1869), Judge Smith sustained the election of
the Ramsey board (Vanderbilt/Morgan-backed) and disallowed the election of the
Church board (Fisk/Gould-backed) on the grounds of fraud. The Fisk directors
appealed Judge Smith's decision. The General Term of the Supreme Court sus-
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a former Attorney General of the United States, wrote:
A moment's attention to this will... show that the confusion, misap-
prehension, and total failure of justice which took place in these
cases, while they could not possibly have happened in any other
country, could scarcely have been avoided in New York ... all par-
ties were fighting under the ensign of public authority. It was judicial
power subverting order and breaking the peace; it was law on a ram-
page; it was justice bedeviled; in one word, it was the New York
Code in full operation.135
Harper's Weekly intoned on point that the judiciary must be reformed:
If scenes of anarchy are to be avoided, if New York is to retain its
preeminence as the commercial metropolis of the country, if foreign
capital is to be retained here, something must be done to prevent, in
the future, the unseemly abuses of power into which certain of our
state judges have been betrayed in the past.136
Thuggery did not end with the Susquehanna War. Consider the plight
of foreign investors with the audacity to entertain lawsuits in New York
to enforce their rights. English shareholders, who owned 450,000 of the
780,000 shares issued and outstanding (and hence, control of the com-
pany in a society ruled by law), were purposely prevented from voting for
their slate of directors in the 1870 board election. Gould's forces won by
a landslide vote of 304,938 to 3,000!137 The English shareholders then
went to both state and federal court to overturn the fraudulent election.
In July 1871, a year after they began their odyssey, the investors obtained
a federal district court judgment in their favor.1 38 But they had to wait
tained the Ramsey Board election and vacated much of the Smith decision on
technical grounds dealing with the right to a jury trial and costs. People v. Albany
& Susquehanna R.R. Co., 5 Lans. 25 (N.Y. Sup. Gen. Term 1871). Resort by all
parties was had to the Court of Appeals, which eventually sustained the Smith
finding of fraudulent conduct by the Fisk/Gould faction. People v. Albany & Sus-
quehanna, 57 N.Y. 161 (1874). The Susquehanna Wars litigation had come to an
end, almost as an anticlimax.
The defeat of Fisk and Gould in the 1869 Supreme Court litigation left the Ram-
sey board in control. In February 1870 it leased the railroad to the Hudson &
Delaware Canal Company (the predecessor to the Delaware & Hudson Railroad),
ending the ability of the Erie to mount a challenge at the New York Central's
Albany gateway. CHAPTERS OF ERIE, supra note 132, at 190.
135. ERIE RAILWAY WARS, supra note 127, at 252 n.23 (citing Jeremiah S. Black, unti-
tled article, GALAXY MAGAZINE, March 1872).
136. Id. at 252-53 (citing HARPER'S WEEKLY, Feb. 12, 1870).
137. Id. at 299-300. At the time, Gould and his allies controlled the Erie. They ac-
cepted the money from the English investors, but never officially transferred the
stock on the company's books to the investors or their representatives, leaving
them without the right to vote in the election.
138. There are four federal cases in this critical litigation to vindicate the rights of En-
glish shareholders. The key case, Erie R.R. Co. v. Heath, 8 F. Cas. 762 (S.D.N.Y.
1871) (No. 4514), was decided in July 1871 and ordered Gould's agents to register
the stock certificates in the names of their English owners, giving them the
franchise. Erie R.R. Co. v. Heath, 8 F. Cas. 761 (S.D.N.Y. 1871) (No. 4513) was a
mandamus action ordering Gould's agents to produce the stock transfer book and
other corporate records. Erie R.R. Co. v. Heath, 8 F. Cas. 763 (S.D.N.Y. 1871)
(No. 4515) denied the petition of Gould's agents for control of unregistered stock
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until December 1871, after yet another fraudulent election, before Gould
would finally be compelled to turn over the stock to them. This battle
cost the investors $25,000 and the loss of control for well more than a
year. Foreign investors also turned to the corrupt legislature, 139 which
refused to repeal the Classification Act, 140 ostensibly because of the
threat of foreign ownership. 141 Such shenanigans surely depressed stock
prices, harmed all investors, and raised the cost of capital.
In the absence of any federal regulations, different laws and judicial
rulings from separate states often came into conflict with one another,
"but the real point is that investors were vulnerable less because of the
substantive inadequacy of American corporate law itself than because of
the lack of enforcement mechanisms and the prospect of corruption.' 42
Thus, in the 19th century, it was very difficult for investors to enforce
their contract rights through litigation, or even lobbying for regulation. 143
The transaction costs of a Londoner or San Franciscan litigating in New
York or Boston were steep. There was also a substantial home court ad-
vantage. With no federal regulation of the capital markets and difficult to
enforce substantive rights, another monitoring device was required to at-
certificates. Finally, Erie R.R. Co. v. Heath, 8 F. Cas. 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1871) (No.
4516) ordered payment to the master for supervising recording of stock certificates
in the names of their rightful owners.
139. ERIE RAILWAY WARS, supra note 127, at 185. In the Gilded Age, New York legis-
lators were paid the princely sum of $3.00 per day. These Solons supplemented
their salary by taking bribes to pass legislation. The rate on important bills ranged
between $2,000 and $3,000. Bribes were the only way to do business with such a
corrupt legislature and legislation was required for railroad charters and key
amendments to charters, such as additional routes, etc.
140. JAY GOULD, supra note 131, at 98. The Erie Classification Act of 1869 was en-
acted to make it difficult to dislodge directors by shareholder vote. The act pro-
vided for classification of directors into five groups, staggering their election over
five years. Id. Modern practice permits only three tiers of classification. Manage-
ment still employs classified boards to thwart hostile takeovers.
Gould's inspiration was the Pennsylvania classification act, created to rebuff his
attack on the Pennsylvania Railroad. The Erie Classification Act perpetuated
Gould's control at a time when the legislature was poised to remove its stock print-
ing privileges that had been employed to great success in the past. ERIE RAILWAY
WARS, supra note 127, at 228, 230.
141. ERIE RAILWAY WARS, supra note 127, at 299-300.
142. Coffee, supra note 130, at 28.
143. Domestically the nation witnessed a rapid acceleration of the trend to
economic concentration that had begun after the Civil War. In the last
third of the nineteenth century the corporation emerged as the dominant
form of industrial organization in the United States, so that by 1890, 65
percent of the goods manufactured in the country were turned out by
corporations, and by 1900, 79 percent were. At the same time that the
percentage of corporate producers was thus increasing, the stock of many
large corporations became publicly held and the ownership so dispersed
that no one stockholder had much of a say in how the corporation was
operated. The result of this phenomenon was that a class of corporate
managers grew up: While they were legally responsible to the stockhold-
ers, that latter body was so numerous that many important corporate
decisions were made by the managers themselves without any thought of
obtaining advance authorization from the stockholders.
WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT 103 (First Vintage Books ed.
2002) (1987).
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tract capital and bring confidence to investors. 1 44
VII. NORMS TO THE RESCUE 145
A fair amount of recent corporate governance literature has dealt with
norms and other non-legal mechanisms of enforcement and regulation.
There is much to be said for their use. An argument can be made that
lessons of the 19th century cannot apply to the complex markets of today
because of the size and diversity of the community. J.P. Morgan and
others could effectively ostracize malfeasors as they were club mates and
prep school chums. The community was also more homogenous; the eth-
ics and norms more accepted, less susceptible to challenge. I make the
analogy to the ethical rules for lawyers. In early 20th century, the Canons
of Ethics promulgated by the American Bar Association had a striking
resemblance to the Ten Commandments-they were pretty straightfor-
ward, almost biblical in tone. Modern professional responsibility rules
found in the Model Rules resemble the Internal Revenue Code and Reg-
ulations in style and format. To recapitulate, the norms of the 19th cen-
tury appear to follow the thou shalt model; modern norms are much more
technical with many more loopholes. Perhaps regulation by norms is a
lost world.
Perhaps not. For example, if it were easy to fire bad employees who
broke the rules without fear of vexatious litigation, society might be able
to more easily use social norms as a useful form of regulation. Litigation
and due process has forced our ever-more legalistic society to seek to
define every possible transgression with exceedingly complex precision.
Furthermore, we are also non-judgmental and we do not want to impose
our moral values on others. If we can distance ourselves from excessive
legalisms and have the gumption to stand in judgment for egregious and
antisocial behavior, norms might make an effective comeback. And soci-
ety and the markets would profit.
A. THE ROLE OF INVESTMENT BANKERS 14 6
In such a chaotic legal environment filled with corruption, investment
banks had to create a system of governance that would assure foreign
144. Substantive enforcement rights were also hard to come by in England. See Franks,
supra note 119, at 12.
145. Portions of this section were adapted from Partner to Plutocrat, supra note 8, at
560-68; see Franks, supra note 119. Norms, informal markets and monitoring
appear to have reined in some of the agency problems in England during the 19th
and 20th centuries before the advent of modern securities regulation.
146. Portions of this section were adapted from Partner to Plutocrat, supra note 8, at
560-68. Until the end of the 19th century, the London capital markets served more
sophisticated savers. Bankers like Morgan acted as critical intermediaries. Robert
J. Cull & Lance E. Davis, International Capital Movements, Domestic Capital
Markets, and American Economic Growth, 1820-1914, in 2 THE CAMBRIDGE
ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, THE LONG NINETEENTH CENTURY
733, 775 (Stanley L. Engerman & Robert E. Gallman eds., Cambridge Univ. Press
2000).
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investors that their investments would be secure. J. P. Morgan & Co.
pioneered the technique of placing a partner of the investment firm on
the board of the corporation. 14 7 Morgan and other underwriters "first
imposed the discipline of both periodic and inclusive financial reports[,]"
while, "Wall Street . . . required the accountants to certify these re-
ports. 1 48 During the last two decades of the 19th century, virtually every
major U.S. railroad developed close ties with one or more U.S. invest-
ment banking firms and the practice of partners from investment banks
and officers of commercial banks going on the railroad's board became
institutionalized. 14 9 "[A] major investment banking firm on [a] corpora-
tion's board offered mutual advantages both to the minority investors
and to the corporate management by protecting both from the prospect
of a stealth attack by a corporate raider seeking to acquire control with-
out paying a control premium.' 1 50 J. P. Morgan and other investment
bankers consequently increased the importance of Wall Street to the
world's economy and provided an atmosphere of solidity and integrity
that the markets needed. 1 51
A similar transfer of power to the market did not take place in Europe.
In America, one of the practices pioneered on a large scale was under-
writing. Jay Cooke & Company employed standard underwriting when it
used $2 million of its funds to underwrite Pennsylvania Railroad bonds.
Cooke bought the bonds from the railroad and then sold them to the
public, in effect guaranteeing the client the funds it needed. This was the
first underwriting of a commercial company. Its ramifications were huge
as underwriting guaranteed client firms sources of reliable funds and as-
sured investors frightened by panics. 52
In Europe, financial institutions like J. P. Morgan either did not exist,
or were too small to underwrite such large equity risks. In addition, they
represented far fewer foreign and domestic clients. 153 Moreover, there
was no great merger wave as there was in the United States from 1895 to
1903 after the passage of the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890.154 The "Act
prohibited price-fixing and collusion among competitors, thereby outlaw-
ing the cartel-like structure that characterized many American indus-
147. Roy, supra note 119, at 133. "In 1879 ... when William Vanderbilt asked the
younger Morgan to help sell some securities necessary to get the New York Cen-
tral through a financial squeeze, Morgan sold securities in England and obtained
the right to select a director, initiating a pattern that would remake the American
economic structure." See also Coffee, supra note 130, at 29-30.
148. ERIE RAILWAY WARS, supra note 127, at 291.
149. Coffee, supra note 130, at 30.
150. Id. at 31; e.g., J.P. Morgan in the 1869 Susquehanna War. ERIE RAILWAY WARS,
supra note 127, at 31-32.
151. THE GREAT GAME, supra note 80, at 153.
152. GEISST, supra note 128, at 75.
153. Coffee, supra note 130, at 32.
154. Id. at 33; see also Brian R. Cheffins, Investor Sentiment and Antitrust Law as Deter-
minants of Corporate Ownership Structure: The Great Merger Wave of 1897 to 1903
1 (Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper No. 77, 2002),
available at http://repositories.cdlib.org/blewp/art77.
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tries. '155 In order to circumvent this prohibition, companies engaged in
horizontal mergers to create monopolies, which could better control
prices. For example, in 1901, J. P. Morgan orchestrated the merger of
eight competing steel companies to form U.S. Steel, the largest corpora-
tion in the world at the time. 156 There was no similar incentive for British
companies to merge in the same fashion, especially since British courts
were not aggressive in the prohibition of cartels or price-fixing. 157
B. THE NYSE As GUARDIAN OF THE PUBLIC INVESTOR 1 5 8
Three important points should be noted about the early history of the
NYSE: 1) activism in governance, such as that of the NYSE, was not the
norm for other stock exchanges around the world;159 2) the NYSE, unlike
with debt securities, "did not possess a de facto monopoly position in
trading equity securities as of the late nineteenth century;" 160 and 3) the
NYSE's activism "seems directly attributable to its organizational struc-
ture and its competitive position.' 161 Before "1900, the Boston Stock Ex-
change was the principal market for industrial securities," due to the
underwriting of New England textile mills and early railroad
corporations.162
There were several key differences between the NYSE and the London
Stock Exchange (LSE). The first difference was the ability of new com-
panies to be listed on the exchange. The NYSE was a very closed system,
while the LSE was wide open.' 63 For example, "[bletween 1850 and
1905, the membership of the LSE rose from 864 to 5,567. In sharp con-
trast, the membership of the NYSE stayed constant between 1879 and
1914 at 1100."'164 A company could only enter the NYSE by buying the
155. Coffee, supra note 130, at 33.
156. It is interesting in retrospect to wonder why the creation of the gigantic U.S. Steel
Corporation was not challenged under the Sherman Act. Perhaps the best answer
is that this combination occurred before the U.S. government began aggressively
to use its powers under the Act. President Theodore Roosevelt, the Trust Buster,
sought successfully to dissolve the Northern Securities Company, which held the
stock of three major trunk lines. N. Sec. Co., 193 U.S., was a 5-4 decision that put
teeth into the Act.
157. Coffee, supra note 130, at 33.
158. Cull & Davis, supra note 146, at 777, 783. Davis and Cull found that investors in
companies on the NYSE were buying a signal of quality. The cartel policies made
the listed companies more expensive but also provided screening, as did the par
value rule. Another paradox found in this interesting market is the NYSE's use of
its monopoly power that ultimately fosters competitive and diversified markets
with a high degree of transparency. The exclusive branding described in this
section was good for its business. Its salutary side effect was that it raised the
quality of the market. The London exchange, as we will see, had the virtue of
competition; in practice its standards were considerably lower.





164. Id. at 34-35.
[U]p to the twentieth century the fear of being seen as a monopoly and
provoking intervention, helped to maintain an open policy on admissions
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seat of an existing member. This closed system provided several incen-
tives that the LSE's open system did not: (1) "the growth of large, diversi-
fied financial services firms (such as J. P. Morgan & Co.)"; 165 (2) the
favoring of self-regulation to protect the value of a member's seat; and
(3) the fragmentation of U.S. equity markets into higher and lower qual-
ity tiers, which promoted competition between exchanges. 166
A second difference between the NYSE and LSE was the membership
rules:
NYSE member firms could raise capital from outsiders-known as
'special partners'-and not all partners in a firm were required to be
members of the exchange. In contrast, the LSE required all partners
in a firm to be members of the exchange and further prohibited
every member from engaging in any other businesses.167
The NYSE's rules allowed American firms to grow much larger, with
better capitalization, than their British counterparts (at least five times
larger) .168
A third difference was each exchange's position on the issue of "com-
petitive versus fixed brokerage commissions.' 1 69 Into the late 19th cen-
tury, the NYSE had fixed commissions, while the LSE permitted variable
commissions. 170 The NYSE's fixed commission policy increased the cost
of trading and generated lower trading volumes, driving the lower priced
stocks off of the exchange, which gave the general public the perception
that such stocks were lower in quality and higher in risk.171 The policy
also forced the NYSE to "limit itself to a high-volume, high-quality busi-
by the London Stock Exchange, along with the interest of the proprietors
in increasing income and discouraging competition. Between 1886 and
1903 a total of 3,854 people applied for membership. . . and only 39, or 1
per cent, were rejected.
RANALD C. MICHIE, THE LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE: A HISTORY 84 (Oxford
Univ. Press 1999). The NYSE used the cost of membership to maintain its exclu-
sivity. In 1904 it cost just £120 to be a member of the London exchange; New York
seats were available for $10,000. Ranald C. Michie, The London and New York
Stock Exchanges, 1850-1914, 46 J. ECON. HIST. 174 (1986) [hereinafter The
London and New York Stock Exchanges].
165. Coffee, supra note 130, at 35.
166. Id. The NYSE specialized in top-tier firms (and still does). Therefore, it vetted
the quality of firms for the dispersed investors.
167. Id. On the surface, the LSE seems more in tune with contemporary notions of free
markets (more access, lower costs of access, competitive commissions, etc.). This
notion makes perfect sense in the Information Age with the Internet and federal
and exchange disclosure requirements. But one must remember that the 19th cen-
tury did not have these tools and markets were susceptible to misinformation by
sharp operators. Therefore, the monitoring performed by investment bankers and
the NYSE was most beneficial.
168. Id. at 37.
169. Id. at 35.
170. Id.
171. The London and New York Stock Exchanges, supra note 164, at 177-86. Another
consequence of the NYSE's fee schedule was that companies with higher par were
listed on it. Low par value companies, such as many mining and manufacturing,
were thus excluded. Over time, the NYSE's deliberate policy of selection and ex-
clusion resulted in the NYSE companies having market capitalization five times
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ness" in order to meet minimum commissions. 172 The limitation also
came out of fear that "listing high-volatility stocks would invite predict-
able insolvencies among its members" (e.g., mining or petroleum compa-
nies). 173 Therefore, the NYSE regularly rejected issuer applications,
"either because the issuer lacked an adequate earnings track record, had
insufficient assets, or was in a high-risk industry."'
1 74
Finally, one of the most important developments of the NYSE was its
mandatory disclosure policy for members, even in the absence of any for-
mal law. In fact, "some financial historians date the advent of modern
financial reporting from 1900, not from 1933, when the federal securities
laws were first adopted." 17 5 Serious self-regulation may actually have
been inaugurated somewhat earlier following the Erie Wars debacle.
Wall Street realized that without supervision and monitoring, it could lose
its position in the global capital markets.176 Its close monitoring acted as
a functional equivalent for future securities regulations, something not
present with the LSE. One of the most important reforms was proscrib-
ing directors from selling their firms short. 177 Short-selling by directors
and other insiders personified by the likes of Daniel Drew, the Specula-
tive Director of the Erie, destabilized the market and led reasonable in-
vestors to conclude the market was rigged. Honesty and such regulation
were good for business-a corrupt market drives away investors who fear
losing their investments to fraud, countenanced by corrupt brokers. An
honest market boosts sales and commissions and leads to increased li-
quidity and investment. Self-regulation would help New York to surpass
London as the dominant capital market within two generations. 178
Consequently, by the end of the 19th century, the investment banking
firms, led by J. P. Morgan & Co. and the NYSE, developed successful
methods of monitoring corporate activity and protecting dispersed share-
holders from predatory practices of speculators and Wall Street insiders.
Thus corporate investors gladly adopted the plutocratic model because
it provided liquidity. Diversified shareholders were able to counteract
the hold-up problem because they could diversify and liquidate their in-
vestment. America's capital needs were so great for its first major indus-
tries (railroads) that local subscriptions and even state subscriptions could
not provide enough capital. The United States was fortunate that it
lagged behind Western Europe in its development. There was a capital
surplus in England and a capital surplus on the Continent because they
had already developed their railroads and canals and the rates of return
greater than those on the LSE. Quotation on the NYSE gave listed firms a pre-
mium that enabled them to gobble up smaller firms in mergers. Id. at 186.
172. Coffee, supra note 130, at 36.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 37.
175. Id.
176. ERIE RAILWAY WARS, supra note 127, at 212-13.
177. Id. at 278.
178. Id. at 213.
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were lower than what was being offered in the United States. Therefore,
the United States enjoyed a flow of surplus capital from Europe to capital
centers-Boston, New York, Philadelphia, etc.-and then into the hinter-
lands to develop infrastructure. In effect, America had people with
money, whether they were wealthy Europeans or wealthy Wall Street
bankers, putting money at risk in foreign territory.
Economically and politically, these investors demanded the one-share/
one vote structure because it provided them with the huge corporation
staffed by professional managers. There was no way for investors to do
the type of local supervision that had been possible with the small mines,
cotton mills, textile mills, and shipping ventures a half century earlier.
These investors were too remote from the business, but they accepted the
separation of ownership from control because the board could hire pro-
fessional managers and raise the capital the business required. Investors
also demanded and received monitoring through their representatives,
their lawyers, and investment bankers. These monitors protected the cor-
poration, and as a result, provided the basis for the liquidity investors
called for.
Simultaneously, due to a large amount of money being organized and
liquefied, was the development of financial intermediaries-investment
banking firms, insurance companies, and a number of other institutions
that helped to channel funds and act as guardians. Hence, there was a
massive inflow of capital during the 19th century, with a lot of it coming
from both Europe and the capital centers of the United States. This flood
of money was predicated upon the plutocratic model driven changes in
the markets and consequently massively lowered the cost of doing busi-
ness since money is a commodity that becomes cheaper and leads to even
greater investment and economic growth.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The American experience is strong support for the proposition that
markets can do a salutary job of developing innovative financing, moni-
toring themselves, and spurring fabulous growth, without an overlay of
state regulation. The United States experience with capital markets dem-
onstrates that vibrant and sound securities markets can arise and prosper
without extensive government regulation or oversight.
At the beginning of the Republic, Hamiltonian financial policies estab-
lished credit and created a strong market for both federal and state secur-
ities. This market and liquidity provided by state banks and the Banks of
the United States created capital that was employed in the development
of transportation and industry.
Before American markets could soar, the problems of business fragility
and control had to be solved. The plutocratic corporation offered busi-
nesses capable of retaining capital expansion and opportunity. Railroads
needed massive amounts of capital, which was raised through a radical
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dispersal of ownership. Railroads also pioneered hierarchical manage-
ment, solving many agency, control, and quality problems.
In the 1860s, the growing securities markets attracted predators and
manipulators threatening the funding of railroads. Prosperity and growth
was predicated upon a national rail system and the foreign capital neces-
sary to fund it. Investment bankers, such as Morgan, reputable stock bro-
kers, other financial intermediaries, and the NYSE developed norms and
methods of operation that ensured the security of the market and pro-
vided needed transparency. The result was an era of tremendous pros-
perity and growth,179 finally ended by the Crash of 1929 and the Great
Depression. 180
179. This article does not make claim that all these good things were caused by the
capital markets. Cheap labor (a result of waves of immigration), for instance, held
down costs. Farm productivity soared, lowering food costs. There was great tech-
nological innovation. All contributed. Clearly, the successful capital markets af-
fected many sectors of the economy and made them more productive.
180. While it is beyond this article, it is the author's contention that the 1929 Crash did
not cause the severity of the Great Depression. Repressive trade policies, the
Smoot-Halley Tariffs, for example, and catastrophic policies by the Federal Re-
serve Bank, turned the crash into a near fatal spiral. New Deal policies, while
generally believed to have negated the worst aspects of the Great Depression, un-
doubtedly contributed to its duration and depth. See JIM POWELL, FDR's FOLLY:
How ROOSEVELT AND His NEW DEAL PROLONGED THE GREAT DEPRESSION
(Crown Forum 2003).
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EXHIBIT 1
Erie Organization Chart Prepared by Daniel C. McCallum
Source: Richard S. Tedlow, Case Commentary and Teaching Technique to Accompany the
Coming of Managerial Capitalism
(Homewood, Ill.: Irwin, 1985), p. 82.
